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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies
within the EMU by focusing, in a dynamic set-up, on asymmetries, externalities,
and the existence of a multi-country context. We study how coalitions among
fiscal and monetary authorities are formed and what are their effects on the
stabilization of output and price. In particular, our attention is directed to study the
consequences on these issues of different institutional contexts in which policy-
makers may act. Among other results, we found that, in the presence of
externalities, the occurrence of asymmetries is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for cooperation.
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1 Introduction
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is a highly integrated
economic area with a large number of interactions between the participating
countries. Given the presence of externalities, the design of macroeconomic
stabilization policies is a crucial issue. In the literature on macroeconomic
policy analysis, the issue of coordination of stabilization policies has been an
important aspect.1 The coordination of macroeconomic policies concerns (i) the
issue of coordination of monetary and fiscal policies and (ii) the coordination of
stabilization policies among diﬀerent countries. Most studies use static models,
in which generally only two (often symmetric) countries act. In the EMU case,
most of these studies argue that the introduction of the EMU, which implies a
common monetary policy and restrictions on fiscal policy at the national level,
increases the need for macroeconomic policy cooperation due to the various
interactions and externalities from national macroeconomic policies. However,
given the potentially adverse reaction by the European Central Bank (ECB),
as a result of free-riding and/or a conflict on the orientation of the policy mix,
fiscal coordination might likely be counterproductive. The introduction of a
third player may have dramatic eﬀects on the standard propositions based on a
two-country model.2 For example, Rogoﬀ (1985) and Kehoe (1988) suggest that,
in this case, cooperation may be counterproductive since the introduction of a
third player may turn the prisoners’ dilemma in a deadlock game.3 Diﬀerent
types of games are mutually compared by Carraro (1997).
Although the usefulness of studying macroeconomic stabilization in a dy-
namic context is well known in the literature4, almost all studies related to a
common monetary area use a static model to derive policy recommendations.
This paper analyzes the design of macroeconomic stabilization policies and their
coordination in EMU using an explicit dynamic structure in which all aspects of
policy coordination have an explicit time and timing dimension. In particular,
policy strategies, the externalities and the payoﬀs obtained by a coalition of
the policy-makers who coordinate their policies depend crucially on the other
policy-makers’ behavior over time in this dynamic approach.
Coordination of (national) fiscal policies and (a common) monetary pol-
icy will be investigated by focusing on the role played by: i) asymmetries (in
structural and preference parameters), ii) externalities, which are the key to
endogenously explain the coalition formation, and iii) the existence of a multi-
1See Daniels and Vanhoose (1998) for a recent survey and, among others, Beetsma and
Bovenberg (1998), Beetsma et al. (2001), and Buti and Sapir (1998) for a discussion related
to the EMU context.
2Notwithstanding the consideration of the ECB can sometimes be considered as the intro-
duction of a third player, the generality of the results cannot automatically be extended to a
three-country monetary union without further investigations.
3 In the deadlock game the non-cooperative strategy is dominant (as in the prisoners’
dilemma) and non-cooperative behavior is better than cooperation. Therefore, no rational
players will cooperate.
4As stressed, e.g., by Turnovsky (1988), Neck and Dockner (1995), and Engwerda et al.
(2002).
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country context, all in a dynamic set-up. The paper addresses the question how
coalitions among fiscal and monetary authorities are formed within the EMU
and what are their eﬀects on the stabilization of output and prices. In par-
ticular, our attention is directed to study the consequences on these issues of
diﬀerent institutional contexts in which policy-makers may act.
The eﬀects of policy coordination will be studied by using the concepts of
strategic bargaining applied to dynamic non-cooperative game theoretic models
introduced in the EMU context by van Aarle et al. (2001a,b).5 The formation
and consequences of coalitions of policy-makers is one of our main interests and
will be investigated by using the recent endogenous coalition formation theory.
This recent literature on endogenous coalition studies non-cooperative games
where the players can play alone (as a ’singleton’) or share their preferences
with other players (coalitions). Therefore, this approach is particularly suited
to study the interactions among players in environments where externalities
occur.6
This paper extends the dynamic two-country EMU model of Engwerda et al.
(2002) in two ways. First, we explicitly introduce the issue of endogenous coali-
tions. Second, the analysis of macroeconomic stabilization policies is extended
to a three-country monetary union. More in detail, we use the partitioned game
approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. According to Yi
(1997), this approach consists in reducing a game in normal form to a two-stage
game (a partitioned game). In the first stage policy-makers try to form coalitions
among them by playing non-cooperatively according to diﬀerent possible initial
assumptions (to which diﬀerent equilibrium concepts correspond). Afterwards,
in the second stage of the game, the coalitions formed (or the singletons) play
non-cooperatively in setting their stabilization policies to face an asymmetric
shock in a dynamic environment as that described in Engwerda et al. (1999)
and (2002).
The model is solved by numerical simulations, which are performed by using
“ad hoc” parameter values. This procedure is rather usual in the literature; see
e.g. Turnovsky et al. (1988), Hughes Hallett (1987), Neck and Dockner (1995),
and Hughes Hallett and Ma (1996). A notable exception is Carraro (1997),
who combines model estimation, preference revelation and game simulation in
a single experiment by assuming no shift of regime during the period which is
considered by him. However, in our case several additional problems prevent
econometric estimation, e.g. assumptions about regime shifts are extremely
diﬃcult to be formulated, too few data are available,7 and, also related to this,
it is virtually impossible to determine a long-run equilibrium, which is necessary
to define the variables of our model.
5Early research (e.g. Plasmans and de Zeeuw (1980)) has focused on axiomatic bargaining
behavior of a similar issue in a non-cooperative setting.
6Examples of such applications are common in the literature on environmental economics
(see, e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco (1992) and Carraro (1998)). But, recently, endogenous
coalition formation theory has also been applied to contexts which are more similar to that
of our paper, e.g., on the formation of trade blocks by Baldwin (1995) and on the formation
of a monetary union by Kohler (2002).
7The EMU exists only since January 1999.
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In our numerical simulations we will consider a model of the EMU based
on three countries where the national governments and the ECB have diﬀerent
priorities. The governments are mainly concerned with output stabilization
whereas the ECB’s primary target (according to art. 105 of its mandate) is price
stabilization in the Euro-area. In addition, we introduce deficit stabilization as
an explicit objective of the individual governments. By doing this we include the
fiscal stringency requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact as an element in
the decision making problem of the fiscal authorities. Interest rate smoothing is
included in the ECB objectives. In the EMU context it is interesting to analyze
how such externally imposed institutional restrictions on policy instruments
aﬀect the design of optimal policies and aspects of policy cooperation.
In our model diﬀerent forms of asymmetry may be investigated: countries
may have asymmetric structural model parameters (model asymmetry), policy-
makers may have diﬀerent preferences (preference asymmetry), policy-makers
may have diﬀerent bargaining powers (power asymmetry), and, finally, shocks
may asymmetrically hit countries (shock asymmetry).
In this paper we restrict our attention to three realistic scenarios where
several policy regimes (coalitions among policy-makers) are analyzed:
a) A benchmark three-country monetary union with model and power sym-
metry. In this case, apart from the shocks, the only form of asymmetry
is the diﬀerent priority placed on output and price stabilization by the
governments and the ECB, respectively.
b) A three-country monetary union with model symmetry but power asym-
metry, where at least one fiscal authority participating in a fiscal coalition
has a lower bargaining power than one of the other participants.
c) A three-country monetary union with model asymmetry (measured by
diﬀerent degrees of openness and competitiveness), characterized by the
ECB, two symmetric countries that are more open and more exposed to
competitiveness than a third country.
Regarding the preference asymmetry, we always assume that the fiscal au-
thorities have the same preferences (mainly concerning output stabilization),
but these preferences will be diﬀerent from those of the ECB (mainly concern-
ing price stabilization).8 Shock asymmetry will always be present as we will
explain later.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes a stylized
model of macroeconomic stabilization in the EMU. Section 3 analyses coali-
tion formation (coalitions as policy regimes) in the context of macroeconomic
stabilization policies in the EMU. To do so, concepts of endogenous coalition
formation are introduced. Section 4 develops simulations of numerical examples
to provide further insights in the basic mechanisms and intuitions. Section 5
concludes by summarizing the main findings of our analysis. In the Appendix
mathematical derivations are gathered.
8Other cases of preference asymmetries are not introduced for reasons of brevity.
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2 A simple dynamic EMU model
The following IS-AS three-country model of the EMU is analyzed:
y1(t) = η1f1(t)− γ1r1(t) + δ12s1(t) + δ13s2(t) + ρ12y2(t) + ρ13y3(t)
y2(t) = η2f2(t)− γ2r2(t)− δ21s1(t) + δ23s3(t) + ρ21y1(t) + ρ23y3(t) (1)
y3(t) = η3f3(t)− γ3r3(t)− δ31s2(t)− δ32s3(t) + ρ31y1(t) + ρ32y2(t)
p˙1(t) = ξ1y1(t)
p˙2(t) = ξ2y2(t) (2)
p˙3(t) = ξ3y3(t)
in which y denotes real output, s the competitiveness of a country vis-à-vis an
other country (i.e. s1(t) := p2(t)− p1(t); s2(t) := p3(t)− p1(t); s3(t) := p3(t)−
p2(t)), r the expected real interest rate, p the price level, f the real fiscal deficit,
and iE the common nominal interest rate. All the variables are in logarithms,
except for the interest rate which is in percentages, and denote deviations from
their long-run equilibrium that has been normalized to zero, for simplicity. A dot
above a variable denotes its time derivative. Although the nominal interest rate
is the same in the whole Euro area, expected real interest rates can temporarily
diverge among countries if expected inflation rates are diﬀerent. The expected
real interest rate in country i ∈ {1, 2, 3}9 is defined as the diﬀerence between
the common nominal interest rate and the expected inflation in this country,
i.e. ri(t) := iE(t) − p˙ei (t). Henceforth, perfect myopic foresight is assumed in
this paper, so that, in our deterministic context p˙ei (t) = p˙i(t).
Equations (1) are the IS curves which give the aggregate demand (AD) in
each of the EMU countries as a function of competitiveness in intra-EMU trade,
the real interest rate, the foreign real outputs and the domestic real fiscal deficit.
Equations (2) describe the aggregate supply (AS) in each of the EMU countries.
Aggregate supply is assumed to be determined by a simple Phillips curve implied
by the existence of some rigidities in the goods and/or labor market in the short-
run. In accordance with our short-run stabilization focus, the eﬀectiveness of
fiscal policy is limited to its transitory impact on output through the induced
stimulus of the aggregate demand.
The above model can be rewritten in the following reduced form for the real
9 In order to save notation, we will often use i to indicate countries or policy-makers.
However, notice the diﬀerence with iE , which is the common nominal interest rate.
5
outputs:10


y1(t)
y2(t)
y3(t)

 =


b11 b12 b13 a11 a12 a13 c1
b21 b22 b23 a21 a22 a23 c2
b31 b32 b33 a31 a32 a33 c3




s1(t)
s2(t)
s3(t)
f1(t)
f2(t)
f3(t)
iE(t)


(3)
The dynamics of the model can then be represented by the following system
of first-order linear diﬀerential equations with the competitiveness variables si(t)
for i = {1, 2, 3} as the state variables, and the national real fiscal deficits fi(t)
and the common nominal interest rate iE(t) as control variables:


s˙1(t)
s˙2(t)
s˙3(t)

 = A


s1(t)
s2(t)
s3(t)

+B1f1(t) +B2f2(t) +B3f3(t) +BEiE(t) (4)
The initial value of the state variables s1, s2 and s3 measures any initial dise-
quilibrium in competitiveness among the three countries. Such an initial dise-
quilibrium in competitiveness could be the result of diﬀerences in fiscal policies
in the past or some initial supply side (price) disturbance in some countries.
We assume that the fiscal authorities control their fiscal policy instrument
such as to minimize the following quadratic loss function which features domestic
inflation, real output and real fiscal deficit with respect to the control variable
fi:
Ji(t0) =
1
2
∞Z
t0
{αip˙2i (t) + βiy2i (t) + χif2i (t)}e−θ(t−t0)dt (5)
in which θ denotes the rate of time preference and αi, βi and χi represent
preference weights that are attached to the stabilization of inflation, output and
fiscal discipline, respectively. The fiscal instrument in the countries’ loss function
may reflect the possibility that excessive deficits in the EMU will be subject to
sanctions, as proposed in the “Excessive Deficit Procedure” of the Treaty of
Maastricht on the European Union (art. 104c), which was signed in 1991, and
its more recent extension to the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997. Therefore,
countries will prefer low fiscal deficits to high deficits. Another way to formulate
this is that the Stability and Growth Pact introduces deficit stabilization, or
deficit smoothing, as an explicit objective of fiscal policy design. More in general,
costs could also result from undesirable debt accumulation and intergenerational
10See the Appendix for the highly non-linear specification of the reduced form parameters
as a function of the structural form parameters of equations (1) and (2). Notice that the
matrix coeﬃcients in the reduced form model (3) are the real output elasticities with respect
to the state and control variables of the model.
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redistribution that high deficits imply and, in that interpretation, χi could also
reflect the priority attached to fiscal retrenchment and consolidation.
As stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB directs the common mon-
etary policy at stabilizing prices and, as long as not in contradiction to price
stabilization, stabilizing output in the aggregate EMU economy. An important
question concerns the (mix of) monetary policy instruments operated by the
ECB. In particular the discussions have centered around the distinction be-
tween an interest rate targeting strategy and a monetary targeting strategy.11
In the first case the short-term interest rate is the main policy instrument, in
the second case some monetary aggregate is targeted by the ECB. While both
strategies will in principle have broadly the same eﬀects, their exact transmis-
sions are somewhat diﬀerent.12 Since interest rate targeting policies and interest
smoothing objectives are currently receiving much attention in monetary policy
analysis (see e.g. Taylor (1999) and Sack (2000)), we choose the EMU-wide
nominal interest rate as the ECB’s monetary policy instrument and add an in-
terest rate smoothing objective in ECB’s cost function e.g. to express the ECB’s
caution in setting the monetary policy. Consequently, we assume that the ECB
is confronted with the following optimization problem:
min
iE
JE(t0) = min
iE
1
2
∞Z
t0
{p˙2E(t) + y2E(t) + χEi2E(t)}e−θ(t−t0)dt (6)
where p˙E :=
P3
i=1 αEip˙i and yE :=
P3
i=1 βEiyi; αEi and βEi indicate the
relative weights of country i’s inflation and output in the average inflation and
output considered by the ECB.
The policy-makers’ loss function can be rewritten as:
J i(t0) =
di
2
Z ∞
t0
{x|(t)Mix(t)}e−θ(t−t0)dt i ∈ {1, 2, 3, E} (7)
where x|(t) := [s1(t), s2(t), s3(t), f1(t), f2(t), f3(t), iE(t)], dj := αjξ
2
j + βj for
j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, dE := 1, and Mi are coeﬃcient matrices defined in the Appendix.
11 Inflation (forecast) targeting has also been proposed as a third alternative monetary policy
strategy. According to this strategy a central bank compares the inflation forecast for some
periods ahead (e.g. two years), which is conditional on the actual short-term interest rate,
with its inflation target. If the forecast exceeds the target, the short-term interest rate must be
raised and vice versa. However, inflation (forecast) targeting does not imply a fully transparent
monetary policy since inflation forecasts are provided by the central bank. Hence, the inflation
(forecast) targeting is not further explored in this paper. In static models this monetary
strategy has, however, been discussed in more detail for the EMU (see e.g. Svensson (1999)).
12 In the monetary targeting case, the common money supply is exogenous and it is assumed
to be the (sole) policy instrument of the ECB. The common interest rate then clears the
common money market. In the interest rate targeting case, the common nominal interest rate
is assumed to be the (sole) policy instrument of the ECB and the common money market is
cleared by adjustments in the money supply. In Engwerda et al. (1999) the ECB implements
a monetary targeting strategy, whereas in van Aarle et al. (2001 a,b) the ECB adopts an
interest rate targeting strategy.
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Henceforth, for reasons of convenience, we assume that t0 = 0 and θ is equal to
zero.13
3 Policy Coordination: A Coalition Formation
Approach
The issue of coalition formation is analyzed by using the partitioned game ap-
proach, which reduces a game in normal form to a two-stage game (a partitioned
game). In the first stage policy-makers try to form coalitions among them by
playing non-cooperatively. In the second stage of the game, the coalitions formed
(or the singletons) play non-cooperatively in setting their stabilization policies
to face an asymmetric shock.
Unfortunately, game theory is far from having achieved a well-defined non-
cooperative theory of coalition formation. Therefore, there are several stability
concepts that can be used and that provide diﬀerent equilibrium coalition struc-
tures. Diﬀerent possible ways to model the endogenous coalition formation could
be helpful in deriving some indications about the optimal institutional design
of the EMU area. In fact, according to Ecchia and Mariotti (1997), diﬀer-
ent equilibrium concepts can be seen as diﬀerent institutional contexts where
policy-makers act. Such a kind of investigation might be particularly interest-
ing in the current European debate where the “final asset” of the EMU is still
under discussion.
More in detail, the possible candidate equilibrium concepts for the first stage
of the game can be grouped in three main categories.
1. The standard Nash equilibrium concept introduced in the coalition liter-
ature by the seminal studies of d’Aspremont et al. (1983) in the indus-
trial organization literature and its several variants as surveyed in Carraro
(1998).
2. The equilibrium concepts related to a sequential entry approach (Sequen-
tial Negotiation Equilibrium).14 With such an approach, one player af-
ter the other decides to propose a coalition to the other players. These
decisions are determined by non-cooperative best-reply rules, given the
coalition structure and the allocation in the previous rounds. One of the
nice features of this approach is that it might explain in terms of history
why specific stable coalitions are reached among the many possible ones.
In other words, the importance of historical relationships between nations
might be captured by this approach.
13Assuming θ diﬀerent from zero, the model could easily be solved following the procedure
used in this paper after a simple transformation of variables, i.e. transforming x(t) into
e−
1
2
θtx(t) and substituting A by A− 1
2
θI where I ∈ IR3×3 is a diagonal matrix with ones on
the main diagonal (see Engwerda et al. (1999), p.263, for further details).
14 See, e.g., Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999).
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3. The solution concepts based on the idea of indirect domination, which
implies farsightedness (Farsighted Coalitional Equilibrium; see, e.g., Chwe
(1994), and Mariotti (1998)). The indirect domination concept captures
the idea that each agent (or coalition of agents), who deviates from a given
coalition structure, has anticipated further deviations of other agents.15
In this paper we focus on the first kind of solution concepts for reasons of
brevity and to keep the model simple. However, some intuitions based on an
informal discussion of the eﬀects of the other two strands of solution concepts
will also be presented.
The second stage of the game (when coalitions have already been formed)
is solved by using the open-loop Nash equilibrium concept as presented in the
previous section.16 .
To formalize possible types of coordination behavior among policy-makers,
we have to introduce some additional notation. We call a coalition any non-
empty subset of the policy-makers’ set (i.e. the set formed by all policy-makers
{1, 2, 3, E}). Moreover, we assume that policy-makers in a coalition coopera-
tively set their instruments in order to minimize a common loss function, i.e.
a convex combination of their respective loss functions. A coalition structure
is a partition of the policy-makers’ set into coalitions. Therefore, each coali-
tion structure is associated with a policy regime, i.e. which policy-makers are
cooperating and which are not.
Indicating by ωi a generic element (coalition) of the coalition structure Ω
(policy regime), we can formally represent the policy coordination game for
each given policy regime as obtaining the (open-loop) Nash equilibrium of the
diﬀerential game defined by the system (4) of diﬀerential equations and by the
loss function(s):
Ji(t) =
1
2
Z ∞
t0



X
j∈ωi
τ jdjx
|(t)Mjx(t)


 dt ∀ωi ∈ Ω,∀j ∈ ωi (8)
15More in detail, according to Ecchia and Mariotti (1998), a multi-stage negotiation pro-
cedure that implies farsightedness can be described informally in the following way. At each
stage, a coalition structure (strategy profile) is the current status quo. Then, one policy-
makers’ coalition may be formed and diﬀerent sets of strategies may be proposed so that
another status quo can be reached. If somebody else (either a policy-makers’ coalition or a
single policy-maker) deviates from the status quo, all members of that coalition are free to
propose to deviate further. The deviating coalition may be the same initial coalition. This
means that there is no permanent commitment: agreements between member policy-makers
are no longer binding when the status quo changes. The policy-makers are only interested in
the loss associated with a permanent status quo. So, the process continues in this way until
there is a status quo from which nobody wishes to deviate. At this point coalitions are defined.
Hence, the farsightedness characteristic replaces the Nash myopic behavior by a longer-term
horizon.
16We assume that there does not exist a transfer mechanism which compensates those agents
who may loose by joining (leaving) the coalition (e.g. side-payments). However, the existence
of a transfer mechanism does not seem to be compatible with the EMU context. This does not
mean that transfer mechanisms cannot be analyzed (see e.g. Casella (1999) and Engwerda et
al. (2002)). These are not considered here, also for reasons of conciseness.
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where Ji(t) is the loss function of the coalition ωi and τ j is the policy-maker
j’s bargaining weight in the coalition ωi.17 The number of coalitions acting in
each regime is clearly equal to the cardinality of Ω, for example if Ω is equal
to {(1, 2, 3), E}, the number of coalitions is equal to 2 and J1(t) is the loss
associated with the (full) fiscal coalition while J2(t) is that associated with the
ECB.
The minimization of the loss function(s) (8) subject to the system (4) of
diﬀerential equations yields the following optimal controls:


f1 (t)
f2 (t)
f3 (t)
iE (t)

 =: Ψ (Ω) s(t). (9)
where s|(t) := [s1(t), s2(t), s3(t)] with the initial disequilibrium s(0) =: s0 ∈ IR3,
and the matrix Ψ (Ω) is computed via the eigenstructure of a matrix that is
determined by the coalition structure Ω (see Appendix).
Note that according to (9) the optimal strategies are a linear feedback rule
on the state variables and are moreover depending on the coalition structure in
place. The resulting (optimal) losses that policy-makers incur equal:
J i(ω) =
di
2
Z ∞
t0
½
s|(t)[I, Ψ (Ω)| ]Mi
µ
I
Ψ (Ω)
¶
s(t)
¾
dt (10)
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, E}.
Using the policy-makers’ optimal costs (10), we will consider the following
policy regimes:
(a) The non-cooperative solution {1, 2, 3, E}, where no policy coordination
occurs.
(b) The grand coalition {(1, 2, 3, E)}, where all policies are set in a cooperative
manner.
(c) The full fiscal coalition {(1, 2, 3), E} and the partial fiscal coalitions: {(1, 2),
3, E}, {(1, 3), 2, E} and {1, (2, 3), E}, where some (or all governments)
agree to coordinate the setting of their fiscal policy.
Partial coalitions involving the ECB and one or two countries are not consid-
ered for the following reasons. First, the ECB is a common institution. Terefore,
partial coalitions between the ECB and only some countries in the Euro area
are, in principle, diﬃcult to justify. Second, previous studies (see van Aarle et al.
(2001a,b)) show that, in general, these coalitions are in most cases unlikely to
arise since they imply losses for the coalition members being higher than those
17 It is trivial that when ωi is a singleton τj = 1 and when equal bargaining powers are
assumed τj is equal to 1 divided by the cardinality of ωi.
10
associated with the non-cooperative solution. Third, considering also the coali-
tion involving the ECB notably increases the number of possible coalitions with
another twelve policy regimes aﬀecting the compact exposition of the results.
As said above, we mainly restrict our attention to the first mechanism of
coalition formation: the coalitional Nash equilibrium (CNE), although other
solution concepts (sequential and farsightedness equilibria) will also briefly be
discussed. A CNE is an equilibrium of a one-shot game where agents simulta-
neously face the problem of accepting or rejecting a proposal that consists in
sharing their loss function and cooperatively setting their instruments. After
that all agents’ decisions are taken, the CNE is formed. More formally the CNE
is characterized by two properties:
1. Profitability property. The losses in the coalition must be lower than
or equal to the non-cooperative losses for all coalition members.
2. Stability property: (a) internal stability: the loss of each coalition mem-
ber must be lower than or equal to the loss that the same policy-maker faces
when she defects from the coalition and the other members do not change
their strategies; (b) external stability: the losses of each non-coalition
member must be lower than the losses that the policy-maker faces when
she joins the coalition.18 A coalition (structure) is said to be stable if it
is both internally and externally stable.
Profitability assures that the coalition is convenient for its members, while
stability guarantees that the equilibrium is self-enforcing. A CNE is based on
the following assumption: when leaving (joining) a coalition, each agent as-
sumes that the other agents are not changing their strategies. In other words,
this assumption is equivalent to the assumption of the Nash conjectures in a
simultaneous oligopoly game where a player assumes no change in the other
players’ decision variable(s) when she modifies her own decision variable(s).19
Under the assumption that non-members can join an existing coalition with-
out the permission of the existing members (open membership assumption),
profitability and stability completely characterize a CNE equilibrium.
Coalition theory often uses other assumptions as exclusive membership and
coalition unanimity (Bloch (1997)). Exclusive membership means that potential
coalition members cannot enter the coalition without the permission of the coali-
tion members. In this case, an equilibrium is characterized by the profitability
and the internal stability properties. Assuming coalition unanimity means that
the whole coalition is assumed to collapse when one of its members defects.
Hence, an equilibrium under unanimity is fully characterized by profitability
only. Notice that in the EMU context most economic policy measures should
be decided by all the members through a qualified or unanimous majority.
18Yi (1997) denotes this condition by the term “stand alone stable”.
19The above definition of stability coincides with the definition of a stable cartel provided
in the oligopoly literature (see d’Aspremont et al. (1983)).
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4 Numerical simulations
4.1 The scenarios
We investigate three possible realistic scenarios where all policy regimes defined
in the previous section are considered.
I In the first scenario we assume a monetary union with model and power
symmetry (symmetric countries). This scenario basically represents the
extension to a three-country case of the two-country model considered by
van Aarle et al. (2001a,b) in a similar game.
II In the second scenario we assume a monetary union with model symmetry
but power asymmetry (e.g. large vs. small countries). More in particular,
one fiscal authority (small country) has a lower bargaining power than the
other two fiscal authorities (large countries).
III Finally, we consider the case of a monetary union with model asymmetry
(diﬀerent degrees of openness and competitiveness), which is characterized
by two symmetric countries that are more open and more exposed to
competitiveness than a third country.
In all the numerical simulations we assume that the governments’ priority
is real output stabilization while the ECB, which equally weighs all countries,
is mainly concerned about price stabilization. In particular, the fiscal policy-
makers are assumed to have the same preferences but, in general, policy-makers
will have diﬀerent preferences (preference asymmetry). More in detail, the
policy-makers’ preferences are assumed to be described by the following val-
ues: α = 0.2, αE = 0.8, β = 0.4, βE = 0.3, χ = 0.15, and θ = 0.15. Moreover,
the initial state of the EMU area is assumed to be equal to s|0 = [0.05, 0,−0.05].
This initial state corresponds to the case of an asymmetric price shock in the
EMU (shock asymmetry) where, initially, prices in country 2 are 5% higher than
in the two other countries. This implies that the low-price countries 1 and 3
initially face favorable terms of trade with respect to the high-price country 2,
and therefore, real output deviations will be positive in the low-price countries
and negative in the high-price one. The other parameters used in the numerical
simulations, as well as the results of our experiments, are described in detail in
the following subsections.
Notice that, considering the shock asymmetry, the first benchmark scenario
shows two full symmetric countries (countries 1 and 3) whereas scenarios II and
III involve that all countries are asymmetric. In fact, in the second scenario
countries 1 and 3 diﬀer from country 2 according to the initial price shock, but
country 1 diﬀers from country 3 with respect to the bargaining power (power
asymmetry). In the third scenario, countries 1 and 3 again diﬀer from country
2 because of (at least) the initial price shock, but country 1 diﬀers from country
3 with respect to the structural parameters (model asymmetry). Hence, our
three-country approach really extends the two-country model of the kind as in
Engwerda et al. (2002).
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4.2 Scenario I - Symmetric countries (model symmetry)
In the first scenario, the structural (form) parameters are assumed to be the
same for all the countries (model symmetry) with the following values: the
aggregate demand elasticity η with respect to the real fiscal deficit is assumed to
be equal to 1, the output semi-elasticity γ of the real interest rate is assumed to
be 0.4, the output elasticity δ of competitiveness is assumed to be 0.2, the output
elasticity ρ of foreign output (degree of openness) is assumed to be 0.4, and the
Phillips curve coeﬃcient ξ, which measures the extent of nominal rigidities,
is assumed to be 0.25. All the policy-makers are assumed to have the same
bargaining power when they cooperate (power symmetry). In this scenario,
the sole form of asymmetry is related to the price shock (shock asymmetry)
which makes the (high-price) country 2 diﬀerent from the other two symmetric
(low-price) countries.
Table 1 presents the results of our first numerical simulation. These results
widely reflect the model and power symmetries assumed. As in a two-country
model (see e.g. van Aarle et al. (2001b)), where these kinds of symmetries are
considered, there is no diﬀerence between the grand coalition C and the full fiscal
coalition F . This occurs because of two characteristics of this scenario related
to the symmetry assumptions. First, as shown in figures 1 and 2 below, the fiscal
policies of the low-price (high-output) countries are exactly oﬀset by the fiscal
policy of the other country, due to the model symmetry and the preference
symmetry among fiscal authorities. Second, due to the model symmetry, the
ECB does not aﬀect the dynamics of the competitiveness since changes in the
common nominal interest rate equally aﬀect all the prices. Results dramatically
change when partial fiscal coalitions are formed, even in this symmetric setting.
With partial fiscal coalitions all the players, including the ECB, are directly
aﬀected in their optimal policies and losses. However, since countries 1 and 3
(low-price countries) face the same shock their optimal losses are the same (or
symmetric in the partial coalitions with the country which suﬀers from high
prices).
Table 1 - Optimal Costs (multiplied by 1,000)20
NC C F (1, 2) (1, 3) (2, 3)
Country 1 0.7092 0.4911 0.4911 0.5470 0.8067 0.6883
Country 2 2.8368 1.9642 1.9642 2.0661 2.7533 2.0661
Country 3 0.7092 0.4911 0.4911 0.6883 0.8067 0.5470
ECB 0 0 0 0.0035 0.0140 0.0035
Average − 0.7368 0. 9821 1. 3066 0.8067 1. 3066
In all the regimes, the higher-price country suﬀers from higher optimal costs
since it faces a positive price shock (increase in price) while the other two coun-
tries face a negative price shock. Consequently, the ECB will mainly pursue
20 In all the tables, columns identify policy regimes; rows 2 to 5 indicate the policy-makers’
(optimal) losses while row 6 shows the average (optimal) loss of each coalition member.
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an restrictive monetary policy in order to stabilize the output (prices) in the
low-price countries.
Profitable regimes are the fiscal regime F (and the grand coalition C) and
the partial coalitions between the high-price country and one of the other two
((1, 2) and (2, 3)), while the coalition between the low-price countries (1, 3) is
not profitable. This result seems to confirm that fiscal coordination is counter-
productive unless asymmetries are present. In fact, in the case of cooperation
between two symmetric countries that face the same kind of price shock (fully
symmetric countries), cooperation increases the countries’ optimal losses. This
result, which is often observed for the two-country models, is due to the central
bank’s action, which oﬀsets that of the fiscal players.21 Cooperation between
countries that face asymmetric shocks (i.e. all the coalitions where the high-
price country is included) is profitable. Related to this observation, in a three-
country context, cooperation between symmetric countries becomes profitable
if they also cooperate with a third asymmetric country.
Regarding the stability property, all the profitable coalitions are internally
stable but only the full fiscal coalition (and the grand coalition) is also exter-
nally stable. Therefore, the full fiscal and the grand coalitions are the CNE
of the game. This result derives from the following two characteristics of the
numerical simulation. First, the ECB cannot neutralize the cooperation among
fiscal players (if they are not all fully symmetric). Second, free-riding behavior is
not optimal for the fiscal players since, when they leave the full fiscal coalition,
they suﬀer higher (optimal) costs.
Considering diﬀerent games of endogenous coalition formation (e.g. sequen-
tial entry or farsightedness), it is easy to argue that the final equilibrium will
always be the full fiscal coalition (or the grand coalition) since it is the first best
for all the policy-makers.
21The robustness of this result was verified with respect to a broad set of model parameters.
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Figure 1 - Non-cooperative regime in scenarios I and II
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Figure 2 - Cooperative regimes in scenario I
The adjustment of the macroeconomic variables under the non-cooperative
and the cooperative22 regimes are reported in figures 1 and 2, respectively. In
both regimes, the ECB is inactive, the fiscal policies in the low-price (high-
output) countries 1 and 3 are restrictive, whereas the high-price (low-output)
22Since in this scenario the full fiscal and the grand coalitions coincide, we speak of coop-
erative regime to indicate both of them.
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country 2 chooses a fiscal expansion policy. However, when policy-makers co-
operate in order to internalize the externalities, the governments of the low-
price countries pursue less restrictive fiscal policies, whereas country 2’s fiscal
authority pursues a less expansionary fiscal policy than that pursued in the non-
cooperative case. The eﬀects of the cooperation are higher volatilities (spreads)
of output and inflation in all countries. Therefore, the reason of the lower losses
associated with cooperative regimes has to be found in the more moderate use
of the fiscal instruments.
4.3 Scenario II - Large vs. small countries (power asym-
metry)
Table 2 describes the results of our second numerical simulation where we inves-
tigate the power distribution among EMU policy-makers. We consider the same
situation depicted in the previous numerical simulation (model symmetry), but
now we assume that country 3 has always a lower bargaining power when it
cooperates with the (an) other policy-maker(s) (power asymmetry).23 More in
detail, country 3 (the small country) is assumed to have a bargaining power
equal to 15 in the grand coalition regime (while the other players share the rest,
i.e. each of them has a bargaining power equal to (
1− 15)
3 ), the small country’s
bargaining power is assumed to be equal to 14 in the full fiscal regime (others
3
8 ), and it is assumed to be equal to
1
3 when the small country cooperates with
one of the other countries (23). Of course, the (optimal) losses associated with
the non-cooperative regime and the coalition between the large country 1 and
the large and high-price country 2 are the same as in table 1. In this scenario,
all the countries are asymmetric through the combination of the power and the
shock asymmetries.
As in the previous scenario the coalition between countries 1 and 3 is not
profitable. But, diﬀerently from table 1, the coalition between the large high-
price country and the small low-price country (2, 3) is not profitable. In fact,
due to the diﬀerent bargaining power distribution, the coalition among the high-
price and the small countries does not show the symmetric (optimal) losses of
that between the large countries (compare the optimal losses of fiscal coalitions
(1, 2) and (2, 3) in tables 1 and 2).
Table 2 - Optimal costs (multiplied by 1,000)
NC C F (1, 2) (1, 3) (2, 3)
Country 1 0.7092 0.5370 0.4355 0.5470 0.7364 0.4564
Country 2 2.8368 1.8760 2.1058 2.0661 2.6462 2.6363
Country 3 0.7092 0.5372 0.4448 0.6883 1.2475 1.1444
ECB 0 0.0020 0.0627 0.0035 0.0752 0.6798
Average – 0.7380 0.9954 1. 3066 0.9919 1. 8904
23The bargaining power of a country can be assumed to be an increasing function of its
relative size (e.g. the share of its GDP with respect to the aggregate GDP of the EMU).
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The coalition between the two large countries (1, 2) is internally stable but
externally unstable since there is an incentive for the small country to join the
coalition. If the ECB is not allowed to participate to a coalition, the fiscal regime
F is both internally and externally stable, and therefore, it is the CNE of the
game since it is also profitable. But if the ECB can join the full fiscal coalition,
the full fiscal coalition is not externally stable any longer. The equilibrium, in
this case, turns out to the non-cooperative equilibrium since if the low-price large
country (country 1) leaves the grand coalition, it achieves a lower (optimal) loss
(recall that if country 1 leaves the coalition, the ECB is also assumed to leave
it).24
The asymmetric distribution of the bargaining power yields two eﬀects: it
reduces the willingness to cooperate of the low bargaining power country and it
redistributes the (optimal) losses among the coalition members in the diﬀerent
policy regimes. The first eﬀect tends to increase the instability of the coalitions
while the second tends to reduce their profitability.
In order to understand the complexity of the policy-makers’ interactions,
note that if coalition members can block the entry of other policy-makers (ex-
clusive membership assumption), the coalition (1, 2) between the two large coun-
tries also becomes an equilibrium of the game since the (large) high-price country
2 can prevent that the small country 3 enters this coalition. Similarly, the full
fiscal coalition becomes an equilibrium since the fiscal authorities can prevent
that the ECB enters the coalition. Considering the unanimity assumption (i.e.
all profitable coalitions are an equilibrium), the number of equilibria increases
since three policy regimes are profitable, i.e. the grand coalition C, the full fiscal
coalition F , and the partial fiscal coalition (1, 2). The eﬀects of farsightedness
are also notable. In our example, consideration about farsightedness does not
enforce the full cooperation, as usual. In fact, in our case, when policy-makers
deviate from profitable but unstable coalitions, they always join a stable and
profitable coalition structure.25
24Note that the CNE is the first best for the low-price countries 1 and 3, while the high-price
(large) country prefers the grand coalition.
25However, further simulations, not reported here, show that increasing the bargaining
power asymmetry, the incentive to deviate rises and, in this case, if profitability is still satisfied,
farsightedness reinforces the (full) fiscal regime and the grand coalition solutions. See also
van Aarle et al. (2001a) for the two-country case.
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Figure 3 - Full fiscal coalition regime in scenario II
The adjustment of the macroeconomic variables under the non-cooperative
and the full fiscal cooperative regimes can be compared by looking at figures
1 and 4. In both regimes, the fiscal policies in low-price (high-output) coun-
tries 1 and 3 are restrictive, and the fiscal policy in the high-price country 2 is
expansionary. When the full fiscal cooperation is considered all fiscal policies
are smoothed (i.e. restrictive policies become less restrictive and expansionary
policies become less expansionary), but the ECB is no longer inactive,26 as in
the non-cooperative case, since, the fiscal policies of countries 1 and 3 do not
exactly compensate that of country 2 because of the power asymmetry. The
eﬀects of cooperation on macroeconomic variables is similar to that exposed in
figure 2, where the equal bargaining power case is depicted. However, since
asymmetric bargaining powers are assumed asymmetric diﬀerences in the (op-
timal) individual losses of the national fiscal authorities are due to the ECB
intervention.
4.4 Scenario III - Diﬀerent openness and competitiveness
(model asymmetry)
In the third scenario, we remove the assumption of model symmetry. We con-
sider the following changes in the structural (form) parameters presented in
our first two scenarios. Countries 2 and 3 are assumed to be subject to a
high structural form output elasticity of competitiveness vis-à-vis country 1
(δ21 = δ31 = 0.4; other δs are assumed to remain the same at a value of 0.2).
26Monetary policy becomes tightening.
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Changes in country 1’s income are assumed to have a strong impact on the other
countries (ρ21 = ρ31 = 0.5) but income changes in countries 2 and 3 are assumed
to have marginal eﬀects on country 1 (ρ12 = ρ13 = 0.1). Changes in the income
of countries 2 and 3 are assumed to have a moderate eﬀect on the income of
the other country (ρ23 = ρ32 = 0.3). These parameters imply that countries 2
and 3 are (relatively) more open and are more exposed to international com-
petitiveness within EMU than country 1. The above parameterization implies
several structural externalities because of the changes in the output elasticities
of openness and competitiveness. An equal bargaining power (power symmetry)
and the same asymmetric price shock (shock asymmetry) as in the previous two
numerical simulations are assumed . Therefore, all the countries are asymmetric
through the combination of the model and the shock asymmetries.
Table 3 describes the results of our final numerical simulation.
Table 3 - Optimal costs (multiplied by 1,000)
NC C F (1, 2) (1, 3) (2, 3)
Country 1 0.6197 0.6918 0.6206 0.9572 0.7740 0.5164
Country 2 4.5840 3.5406 3.7709 3.6855 4.7241 2.0314
Country 3 0.5487 0.6759 0.5912 0.7560 0.5166 1.9514
ECB 0.0161 0.0246 0.0013 0.0177 0.0520 0.0104
Average – 1.2332 1.6609 2.3214 0.6453 1.9915
Despite the fact that several asymmetries are present, no coalitions are prof-
itable. This means that the unique CNE is the non-cooperative regime, which
is not the first best for any of the policy-makers. The eﬀects of cooperation
on the policy-makers’ (optimal) losses are rather complex. All the cooperative
regimes are profitable for the high-price country 2, but all the coalitions includ-
ing country 2 imply higher (optimal) losses for the other participant(s). The
sole profitable coalition for the low-price (open) country 3 is the partial coalition
with the other low-price country 1. However, the optimal strategy of country 1
is to free-ride since its optimal strategy is always to avoid cooperation with the
other policy-makers.27
The adjustment of the macroeconomic variables associated with the non-
cooperative regime is described in figure 4. Since the country one’s restrictive
fiscal policy has a large negative eﬀect on the outputs of countries 2 and 3, the
ECB follows an expansionary monetary policy. The figure 4 clearly illustrates
that model asymmetries imply a very diﬀerent (optimal) behavior of the policy-
makers.
27The first best policy regime (coalition structure) for country 1 is the fiscal coalition be-
tween the fiscal authorities of the other two (more open) countries.
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Figure 4 - Non-cooperative regime in scenario III
Taking into account the other endogenous coalition formation games, the
lack of profitability implies that a solution being diﬀerent from the non-cooperative
one will never emerge. Therefore, under this parameterization, the non-cooperative
result is quite robust with respect to diﬀerent specifications of the coalition for-
mation process (e.g. exclusive membership, sequential entry or farsightedness).
The ultimate non-cooperative result seems to show that the existence of
asymmetries is a necessary condition to observe gains in the cooperation but it
is not a suﬃcient condition.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper focuses on how coalitions among fiscal and monetary authorities are
formed and what are their eﬀects on the stabilization of output and inflation. In
doing that, we introduce a novelty in the literature by combining the following
two aspects of policy coordination:
(a) macroeconomic stabilization policies of individual countries and a com-
mon central bank of a monetary union are considered in a three-country
dynamic model,
(b) coalition formation among policy-makers to coordinate their policies is
explicitly considered by using the recent approach of endogenous coalition
formation theory.
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More in detail, our paper extends the dynamic two-country EMU model
of Engwerda et al. (2002) by using the partitioned game approach of the en-
dogenous coalition formation literature. This approach consists in reducing a
game in normal form to a two-stage game. In the first stage policy-makers try
to form coalitions among them by playing non-cooperatively according to dif-
ferent possible initial assumptions (to which correspond diﬀerent equilibrium
concepts). Afterwards, in the second stage of the game, the coalitions formed
(or the individual policy-makers) play non-cooperatively in setting their stabi-
lization policies to face an asymmetric shock in a dynamic environment.
Coordination of (national) fiscal policies and (a common) monetary policy
was then investigated through several numerical simulations where we have con-
centrated our attention on the role played by asymmetries (in structural and
preference parameters) and externalities, which are the key to endogenously
explain the coalition formation.
We have considered three scenarios for numerical simulations: i) a mone-
tary union composed by three symmetric countries, that face an asymmetric
shock, ii) a monetary union where a small country interacts with two large
countries, that face an asymmetric shock, and iii) a monetary union composed
of two (relatively) open countries that face an asymmetric shock, and interact
with a (relatively) closed country. From our numerical simulations five major
conclusions can be derived.
1. Regimes diﬀerent from the grand coalition, the full fiscal coalition, and the
non-cooperative regime are never an equilibrium of the game. In fact, the
full fiscal coalition is always the equilibrium in the first scenario and it is
also so in the second scenario according to some equilibrium concepts only,
whereas the grand coalition is an equilibrium only in the first case (where
it coincides with the full fiscal coalition because of the symmetries). In
the third scenario, the non-cooperative regime is the equilibrium of the
game for all equilibrium concepts considered.
2. As for the static two-country models, fiscal coordination seems to be
counter-productive unless asymmetries are present. In fact, in the first
scenario countries want to cooperate only if they are subject to asymmet-
ric shocks. However, considering three countries, two symmetric countries
can benefit from cooperation if they coordinate their fiscal instrument with
that of a third asymmetric country.
3. In our benchmark case (the first scenario) cooperation always implies the
lowest losses for all fiscal authorities without aﬀecting the optimal cost
of the ECB. Therefore, it turns out to be the equilibrium of the game
irrespective of the equilibrium concept that is used to solve the game.
4. Under asymmetric bargaining powers (scenario two) the full fiscal coalition
diﬀers from the grand coalition and the equilibrium of the game depends
on the assumptions considered. However, the grand coalition is never an
equilibrium of the game, whereas the full fiscal coalition is an equilibrium
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(but not unique) under the unanimity and exclusive membership assump-
tions.
5. In the third scenario, the less open and less exposed to intra-EMU com-
petition country always wants to free-ride and does not want to cooperate
with the more open and exposed counties. Furthermore, the more open
and exposed counties do not want to cooperate with each other. Hence,
this scenario, where many asymmetric externalities are present, illustrates
that the existence of asymmetries and externalities is a necessary but not
suﬃcient condition for cooperation since the unique equilibrium is the
non-cooperative solution.
We think that this latter observation deserves further attention, so that we
would like to investigate the impact of the sign and the size of spillovers on
coordination in the near future. In addition, we would like to explicitly consider
diﬀerent equilibrium concepts and study how they are related to the institutional
setting of the EMU.
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Appendix
Reduced form of the model
Defining the following matrices:
m|1 :=


b11
b12
b13
a11
a12
a13
c1


:= ∆1


δ12 − ρ12k3δ21+ρ13ρ32δ21k3k2−ρ32ρ23
δ13 − ρ12ρ23δ31+ρ13k2δ31k3k2−ρ32ρ23
ρ13(ρ32δ23−k2δ32)−ρ12(ρ23δ32−k3δ23)
k3k2−ρ32ρ23
η1
ρ12k3η2+ρ13ρ32η2
k3k2−ρ32ρ23
ρ12ρ23η3+ρ13k2η3
k3k2−ρ32ρ23
−γ1 −
ρ12(γ2k3+γ3ρ23)+ρ13(γ3k2+γ2ρ32)
k2k3−ρ23ρ32


m|2 :=


b21
b22
b23
a21
a22
a23
c2


:= ∆2


−δ21 − ρ21k3δ12+ρ23ρ31δ12k3k1−ρ31ρ13
ρ23(ρ31δ13−k1δ31)−ρ21(ρ13δ31−k3δ13)
k3k1−ρ31ρ13
δ23 − ρ21ρ13δ32+ρ23k1δ32k3k2−ρ32ρ23
ρ21k3η1+ρ23ρ31η1
k3k1−ρ31ρ13
ρ21k3η1+ρ23ρ31η1
k3k1−ρ31ρ13
ρ21ρ13η3+ρ23k1η3
k3k1−ρ31ρ13
−γ2 −
ρ21(γ1k3+γ3ρ13)+ρ23(γ3k1+γ1ρ31)
k1k3−ρ13ρ31


m|3 :=


b31
b32
b33
a31
a32
a33
c3


:= ∆3


ρ31(k2δ12−ρ12δ21)+ρ32(ρ21δ12−k1δ21)
k2k1−ρ21ρ12
−δ31 + ρ31k2δ13+ρ32ρ21δ13k2k1−ρ21ρ12
−δ32 + ρ31ρ12δ23+ρ32k1δ23k2k1−ρ21ρ12
ρ31k2η1+ρ32ρ21η1
k2k1−ρ21ρ12
ρ31ρ12η2+ρ32k1η2
k2k1−ρ21ρ12
η3
−γ3 −
ρ31(γ1k2+γ2ρ12)+ρ32(γ2k1+γ1ρ21)
k1k2−ρ12ρ21


where ki := 1− γiξi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and


∆1
∆2
∆3

 :=


k3k2−ρ32ρ23
k1(k3k2−ρ32ρ23)−ρ12(k3ρ21+ρ23ρ31)−ρ13(k1ρ31+ρ31ρ21)
k3k1−ρ31ρ13
k2(k3k1−ρ31ρ13)−ρ21(k3ρ12+ρ13ρ32)−ρ23(k1ρ32+ρ31ρ12)
k2k1−ρ21ρ12
k3(k2k1−ρ21ρ12)−ρ31(k2ρ13+ρ12ρ23)−ρ32(k1ρ23+ρ21ρ13)

 ,
we can rewrite the reduced form equations for real outputs as:
y1(t) = : m1x(t)
y2(t) = : m2x(t)
y2(t) = : m3x(t)
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with x|(t) := [s1(t), s2(t), s3(t), f1(t), f2(t), f3(t), iE(t)].
The coeﬃcients of the dynamic law of motion of the system s˙(t) = As(t) +P3
i=1Bifi(t) +BEiE(t) are then given by the following expression:


s˙1(t)
s˙2(t)
s˙3(t)

 =


ξ2b21 − ξ1b11 ξ2b22 − ξ1b12 ξ2b23 − ξ1b13
ξ3b31 − ξ1b11 ξ3b32 − ξ1b12 ξ3b33 − ξ1b13
ξ3b31 − ξ2b21 ξ3b32 − ξ2b22 ξ3b33 − ξ2b23




s1(t)
s2(t)
s3(t)

+
+


ξ2a21 − ξ1a11
ξ3a31 − ξ1a11
ξ3a31 − ξ2a21

 f1(t) +


ξ2a22 − ξ1a12
ξ3a32 − ξ1a12
ξ3a32 − ξ2a22

 f2(t)+
+


ξ2a23 − ξ1a13
ξ3a33 − ξ1a13
ξ3a33 − ξ2a23

 f3(t) +


ξ2c2 − ξ1c1
ξ3c3 − ξ1c1
ξ3c3 − ξ2c2

 iE(t).
After some tedious algebra,we can rewrite the government i’s loss function
as:
Ji =
1
2
Z ∞
t0
©
αip˙2i (t) + βiy
2
i (t) + χEi
2
E(t)
ª
e−θ(t−t0)dt =
=
1
2
¡
αiξ
2
i + βi
¢ Z ∞
t0
{x|(t)(m|imi +
χi
di
e|i+1ei+1)x(t)}e−θ(t−t0)dt =
=
1
2
¡
αiξ
2
i + βi
¢ Z ∞
t0
{x|(t)Mix(t)}e−θ(t−t0)dt
where ei is a vector with all entries equal to zero, except for entry i that is equal
to one.
Similarly, we can rewrite the ECB’s loss function as:
JE =
1
2
Z ∞
t0



Ã
3X
i=1
αiE p˙i(t)
!2
+
Ã
3X
i=1
βiEyi(t)
!2
+ χEi
2
E(t)


 e
−θ(t−t0)dt =
=
1
2
Z ∞
t0



Ã
3X
i=1
αiEξyi(t)
!2
+
Ã
3X
i=1
βiEyi(t)
!2
+ χEi
2
E(t)


 e
−θ(t−t0)dt =
=
1
2
Z ∞
t0



Ã
3X
i=1
αiEξmix(t)
!2
+
Ã
3X
i=1
βiEmix(t)
!2
+ χEi
2
E(t)


 e
−θ(t−t0)dt =
=
1
2
Z ∞
t0
{x|(t)MEx(t)}e−θ(t−t0)dt
whereME :=
³P3
i=1 αiEξm
T
i x(t)
T
´³P3
i=1 αiEξmix(t)
´
+
³P3
i=1 βiEm
T
i x
T (t)
´
³P3
i=1 βiEmix(t)
´
+ χEx(t)
|e|5e5x(t).
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The basic algorithm to derive the game solutions
The algorithm is described by the following 5 steps.
1. Factorize matrices Mi as
Mi =


Qi Pi Li Ki Si
P |i R1i Ni Hi Ti
L|i N
|
i R2i Fi Vi
K|i H
|
i F
|
i R3i Wi
S|i T
|
i V
|
i W
|
i R4i


for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, E}, where Qi ∈ IR3×3; Pi, Li, Ki ∈ IR3×3; and the other
coeﬃcients are scalars.
2. Compute the following matrices:
G :=


R11 N1 M1 T1
N|2 R22 F2 V2
H|3 F
|
3 R33 W3
T |E V
|
E W
|
E R4E


H1 :=


−A 0 0 0 0
Q1 A| 0 0 0
Q2 0 A| 0 0
Q3 0 0 A| 0
QE 0 0 0 A|


H2 :=


B1 B2 B3 BE
−P1 −L1 −K1 −S1
−P2 −L2 −K2 −S2
−P3 −L3 −K3 −S3
−PE −LE −KE −SE


H3 :=


P |1 B
|
1 0 0 0
L|2 0 B
|
2 0 0
K|3 0 0 B
|
3 0
S|E 0 0 O B
|
E


M = H1 +H2G
−1H3
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4. After computing the eigenstructure of M , take three positive eigenvalues
and the corresponding eigenvectors vi (for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) to write the following
expression:28


X
Y1
Y2
Y3
Y4


:=
¡
v1 v2 v3
¢
:= z ∈ IR4×3
from which we can derive the optimal controls:


f1
f2
f3
iE

 = −G
−1


P |1 +B
|
1CL1
L|2 +B
|
2CL2
K|3 +B
|
3CL3
S|E +B
|
ECL4

 s =: CLs
where CLi := YiX−1.
5. Rewrite the cost functions of the policy-makers and the dynamics of the
model as Ji = 12
R∞
0
s|
·
(I, CL|)Mi
µ
I
CL
¶¸
s dt and s˙ = (A+B CL) s =:
ACLs, respectively. The problem is then solved by considering:
Ji = s
|
0Xis0
where Xi solves the following Lyapunov equation:
A|CLXi +XiACL +
1
2
(I,CL|)Mi
µ
I
CL
¶
= 0
Cooperative solutions are achieved by using the same algorithm and factor-
izing Mi matrix in a similar way as in van Aarle et al. (2001b).
28 If matrix M has more than three positive eigenvalues multiple equilibria arise, whereas if
this matrix has less than three positive eigenvalues no equilibrium exists (for more details see
Engwerda (1998)).
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